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Abstract
With the restraints on both monetary and fiscal policy in Stage 3 of Economic and
Monetary Union great pressure is put on structural policies and the operation of the la-
bour market in particular to limit the adverse impact of asymmetric shocks and eco-
nomic fluctuations.  This paper contrasts the position of Finland, which is the only part
of Northern Europe in the euro area with other parts of the region and similar regions.
Drawing on earlier work on the flexibility of the Finnish economy (Vilmunen and
Mayes, 1998) this paper explores whether the form of centralised bargaining practised
in the region offers an adequate ability to respond to the prospective shocks.The onset of the euro area offers a new challenge on the member states to be able to adjust to eco-
nomic shocks.  The traditional monetary, fiscal and regulatory instruments of economic policy are
now constrained, moving their position towards that of regional administrations in a wider state. Yet
at the same time there has been no move towards the inter-regional fiscal transfers that characterise
most federal systems.   If the costs of such shocks, particularly in terms of unemployment, is not to
increase the member states must either find new adjustment mechanisms of improve the effective-
ness of those that already exist.  One of the main messages that has been put forward is increased
‘labour market flexibility’ (see Council of State, 1997, for example).  Thus if the impact on the la-
bour market cannot be reduced so much by other policies the labour market itself must adjust rather
better.
There has been a presumption in many quarters (OECD, 1994) that this flexibility would come from
substantial deregulation of the labour market and a move towards decentralised bargaining, perhaps
along the lines of New Zealand (Mayes and Silverstone, 1998; Chapple, Harris and Silverstone,
1995).  However, it is arguable (Council of State, 1997; Teulings and Hartog, 1998) that this flexi-
bility could also come through the ability of centralised bargaining to negotiate economy-wide, en-
forceable agreements.  Such agreements could alter real wages and conditions right across the la-
bour market in order to limit the impact of shocks on employment in a manner perceived as fair.
This would be an illustration of the Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argument that it is the extremes of
centralisation and decentralisation in wage bargaining that are most likely to deliver efficient out-
comes.
It is, however, notable that this expectation is not necessarily shared in practice. For example, of the
five Nordic countries Iceland and Norway have chosen not to participate in the EU, Denmark and
Sweden have chosen not to participate in the euro area and only Finland is a full participant in Stage
3 of Economic and Monetary Union.  There are of course many other reasons for non-participation
but if we take the Swedish case as an example.  In its assessment of the impact of membership of
Stage 3 on Sweden the Government Commission on the EMU (Calmfors, 1997) places the problem
of reducing unemployment first among the arguments that lead it to conclude that Sweden should
not be in the first wave of countries joining.  
‘There is a significant risk in participating in the monetary union with the current high
level of unemployment.  It would be very serious if Sweden were exposed to new
macroeconomic disturbances that could not be counteracted by monetary and e x-
change rate policies.  This could lead to further increases in unemployment from to-
day’s high level.  To a large degree, this valuation is based on macroeconomic experi-
ences of the last decade in Sweden and other EU countries, which have shown how
easily an upturn in unemployment can become permanent.’
Our main concern in this paper is to examine the case of Finland, as it will face the problem of ad-
justment under EMU first among the Nordic countries.
1 We consider first of all the degree to which
the centralised bargaining regime in Finland seems to have an ability to adjust to shocks over the
period 1960 to 1996. We compare this to a more decentralised regime, like that of New Zealand.
Secondly, by using cross section data for the whole of the OECD over the period 1973 to 1996, we
explore the interaction between labour market institutions and central bank structures in affecting
inflation and unemployment. We use these results to consider two further issues.  First, the extent to
which the Calmfors and Driffill hypothesis - that it is the two extremes of centralisation and decen-
tralisation of wage-bargaining that show the least unemployment costs from shocks - is borne out.
Second, the impact that the change from monetary policy being run by the Bank of Finland to being
run by the ECB is likely to have on unemployment.
In general terms, our conclusions are that the exchange rate did not form an important part of the
adjustment mechanism of unemployment in Finland until recently, so membership of EMU is not
likely to impose substantial extra constraints.  However, by the same token Finland has not shown
flexible responses to shocks, so the structure of behaviour will need to be different in the absence of
favourable shocks if unemployment is to continue to fall rapidly.  EMU, however, appears to beassist the further fall in unemployment.  Furthermore, we find some support for the hypothesis that
Finland will be advantaged compared to some of the other euro countries in its response to shocks
through the structure of its wage bargaining regime.
2  Contrasting results – Finland compared
Following Mayes and Vilmunen (1998) we explore a small model of the labour market in an open
economy based on Jacobson et al. (1996). The estimated model is a four-equation system that
jointly determines unemployment, real wages, the capital stock and the terms of trade. It is based on
firms’ profit maximising behaviour from a Cobb-Douglas production function, labour supply under
constrained utility maximisation by workers and the terms of trade balancing aggregate demand and
supply.  The economy is subject to shocks from technology, the rest of the world, wage setting and
the supply of labour.
We begin by assuming that production possibilities can be described by the (log of the) Cobb-
Douglas functional form
where y, k and l denote, respectively, output, capital and labour, and m is a stochastic shock to
technology or production possibilities (i.e. a productivity shock), whose generating process may
contain a unit root. From this we can derive the capital and labour required.  Employment is given
by
where n = ln(W/P) is the real product wage, W  the nominal wage, P the output price and z an em-
ployment shock. If the firm is maximising profits, then g1 = bg2 and g2 = 1/(1-a) and z = g2m. Capi-
tal is determined by
where r is the (log of the) rental price of capital, R, or, simply, the real interest rate. In what follows
we have simplified the model treating the real interest rate as constant
2 and hence subsumed by the
constant r0. Note that employment and capital stock share the same shock z, derived from the un-
derlying shocks to technology, m. For this reason z will be simply referred to as =a technological
shock=. Under profit maximisation r1 = a/(1-b).
Labour supply is given by
where w = ln(W/P) is the consumption real wage and P is the consumer price index with the share
of domestic consumer goods in the index denoted by f
3. Non-modelled factors affecting labour
supply decisions by households
4 are represented by the stochastic shift variable x, which is gener-
ated by a process that potentially contains a unit root.
We assume that the wage setting relation is
m a b t t t t   +   l   +   k   =   y                                                              (1)
z n g g g t t 2 t 1 0 t   +       -   k     +     =   l                                                    (2)
z r r r t t 2 t 1 0 t   +   r     -   l     +     =   k                                                  (3)
x q t t
s
t   +   w   =   l                                                                         (4)where u and q denote, respectively, the log of unemployment U and the terms of trade Q
5. This par-
ticular form of the wage setting equation differs slightly from the standard one in the literature (e.g.
Jacobson et al. eq. (4) p. 4) where the real product wage is expressed in terms of unemployment and
productivity. Equation (5) uses the real consumption wage, as the difference between real product
and real consumption wage in an open economy is related to the terms of trade.  For a Cobb-
Douglas type consumer price index n - w = - (1-f) q.  Since labour supply decisions depend on the
consumption real wage and labour demand decisions on the real product wage, changes in the terms
of trade will affect the state of the labour market
6.  The terms of trade are an important potential
source of aggregate fluctuations affecting small open economies.
The non-modelled factors affecting wage formation, i.e. shocks to wage formation, ww, t, are also
assumed to be generated by a process that potentially contains a unit root
7. Hence, all the shocks in
the model can be represented by a simple random walk without loss of generality w.r.t. the long-run
properties of the model
where 0 < y £1
8.
Finally, fluctuations in the terms of trade are assumed to evolve according to
where di > 0. Equation (7) can be derived by combining an IS-schedule linking competitiveness to
aggregate demand (at the constant real interest rate)
9 with an aggregate supply behaviour implied by
(1) -  (3), i.e. the terms of trade balances aggregate demand and supply. Under this interpretation,
the terms of trade shocks wq is a combination of aggregate demand and supply shocks (or shocks to
the production technology). Thus it is possible that wq is generated by a process containing a unit
root, so that wq can be represented as wq,t = yqwq,t-1 + gq,t, 0 < yq £1. An alternative interpretation
relies on mark-up pricing under exogenous terms of trade shocks.
It is possible to transform the model into a standard Vector Error Correction format. Without solv-
ing the model explicitly (see Jacobson et al. 1996), we know that the vector of the four endogenous
variables of interest, X = (u, w, q, k)= can be solved
10 as a linear function of the underlying vector of
shocks F = (z, ww, x, wq)= = (V, wq)=, i.e.
where A is (4 x 4)-matrix summarising the impact effects of the shocks
11. From (2) and (4) we can
obtain an expression for (the rate of) unemployment
12 (the constant has been ignored)
The demand for capital function (3) can be written as  (once again ignoring the constant)
w s s t   w, t 2 t 1 t   +   q     +   u   -   =   w                                                    (5)
e y t   V, 1 - t t   +   V     =   V                                                       (6)
w d d t   q, t 2 t 1 t   +   l     -   k     -   =   q                                                  (7)
F   A   =   X t t                                                                           (8)
z x g f g g q t t t 1 t 2 t 2 t
s
t t   -     +   k     -   q   ) - (1   -   w   ) + (   =   l   -   l   =   u .       (9)which is helpful when interpreting possible cointegration relationships.
2.1  Results for Finland
Semi-annual data for Finland are used covering the sample period 1960.1 - 1996.2.
13 The variables
included in the empirical analysis are the logarithm of the rate of aggregate unemployment (u), real
consumption wage (the ratio of average earnings to the CPI, 1990 = 100, w), terms of trade (ratio of
export prices to import prices, 1990 = 100, q) and net capital stock in the business sector (k). We
approach the estimation of this four equation in the standard VECM format using Johansen’s (1995)
procedure.  The first step is to ensure that there are unit roots in each of the equations so that they
are conformably integrated before moving on to determine the cointegrating relationships among
the four variables.
Appendix I contains summary tables of the tests for unit roots. In conducting the tests, lags up to 4
(i.e. two years) were included, which appeared to be sufficient to filter out most of the autocorrela-
tion remaining in the residuals after fitting an AR-process to the time series. Table I.1 summarises
the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests.
Even though the formal test suggests a unit root in the (log) level of the variables in the system, the
unemployment rate as well as the capital stock appear borderline cases, but in different directions.
Whereas the log of the unemployment rate comes close to being stationary, the log of the capital
stock appears to come very close to being an I(2) process! In particular the null of a unit root in the
DGP for the rate of unemployment cannot be rejected when more lags are included in the ADF test.
This may be a reflection of the reduction of power in unit root testing when the number of lags is
increased
14. On the other hand, the sum of the estimated AR-coefficients, in the case of the log of
the capital stock, appears to be large in comparison to the corresponding ones of other variables in
the system, and even exceeding one, once lags are added.  Further evidence is provided by table I.2,
which tests for a unit root in the first difference of the series (i.e. growth rates)
15.
At face value, Table I.2 seems to suggest that there is also a unit root in the growth rate of real
wages and the capital stock. However, the b-coefficient on the relevant lagged difference for the
growth rate of real wages is 0.48 and 0.42 at lags 3 and 4 respectively and the ADF-test suggests a
unit root in the process generating growth in real wages. For the capital stock, on the other hand, the
b-coefficients are higher, but still well bounded above by 0.9. This suggests that there is a substan-
tial amount of autocorrelation in the growth rate of the capital stock or that the growth rate of the
capital stock series is relatively ‘smooth’
16.
Further specification tests
17 suggest the following observations; (i) general as well as ARCH-type
heteroscedasticity is present in the residuals from the ADF-test equation, which cannot be removed
by the usual procedure of adding in further lagged differences. (ii) graphical inspection indicates
that there are two large residuals around the year 1990, which give rise to deviations from normality
in the form of thick tails and skewness to the left. These deviations from the ideal conditions un-
derlying the ADF-tests tend to reduce the efficiency of these tests in finite samples
18. Overall, then,
the decision to reject the hypothesis of unit root nonstationary growth rates of the variables in our
system should be viewed with caution, especially because of the test results for the growth rate of
the capital stock. With this in mind, we will continue to the cointegration analysis under the as-
sumption that the vector time series Xt = (ut, wt, qt, kt) is generated by an I(1) vector process.
Johansen’s procedure was followed to test formally for the dimension of the cointegration space as
well as to run weak exogeneity tests on some of the variables, most notably the capital stock, w.r.t.
the parameters of the cointegration relationship among four variables in our system. Appendix IIA
gives the relevant summary tables from the (unrestricted) cointegration analysis
19. According to Ta-
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                                          (10)the cointegration rank be 1, i.e. there is evidence of one cointegration relationship between the un-
employment rate, real consumption wage, capital stock and terms of trade in Finland. The unre-
stricted estimates of the b-matrix as well as of the loading matrix (vector) a corresponding to the
proposed cointegration vector - maximal eigenvalue or canonical correlation - (emboldened) are
Table II.1c.
Given that the cointegration dimension is one, the estimated cointegration vector appears to be rea-
sonable from an economic point of view. In particular, if we could conclude that it is an unemploy-
ment equation, the signs of the individual coefficients are consistent with theory, although they are
perhaps a little too large (in absolute value).
Overall, then, Table II.1c seems to suggest that the following linear combination of the unemploy-
ment rate, real consumption wage, capital stock as well as the terms of trade in the Finnish data,
normalised by the unemployment rate,
(where the hat signifies ‘estimated’), is stationary, i.e. I(0). The corresponding standardised (factor)
loadings in Table II.1d, which interpret the effect of the disequilibrium error corrected for lagged
differences
20, indicate stable error correction dynamics.
The structure of the estimated loading matrix has an interesting structure.  In the present context we
can write the VECM as
Table II.1d seems to suggest that the factor loading on the capital stock is zero, and very small on
real wages and perhaps also on the terms of trade. We tested the hypothesis of zero loading on the
capital stock using Johansen=s likelihood ratio test
21.
We also tested for the weak exogeneity of the capital stock and real wage for the long-run parame-
ters, because it is an interesting hypothesis in itself in the sense that if not rejected it implies that
real wages are not error correcting. Unemployment, on the other hand, will respond to all sources of
exogenous shocks directly and through endogenous adjustment
22. This hypothesis cannot be r e-
jected (p-value is 0.605). Finally, we tested for the weak exogeneity of the capital stock, real wages
and terms of trade for the parameters of the cointegrating relations. The p-value drops drastically, to
0.059, so that formally this hypothesis is a borderline case. The estimated unrestricted ba vector is
now (1.003, -2.864, 1.154, 1.166)
23. It should, however, be noted that though formally a borderline
case, the sharp drop in the p-value in the last exogeneity test is perhaps best interpreted as a warning
to the modeller; the numerical test results should not be taken at face value and interpreted too rig-
idly to avoid running the risk of accepting too easily. In order to check for this possibility, we tested
for the weak exogeneity of the terms of trade alone w.r.t. the long-run parameters and the test result
has a low p-value of 0.065. Once again, this is formally a borderline case, but strongly suggesting
that the terms of trade is, in the end, not weakly exogenous.
q   1.63   +   k   1.53   +   w   3.23   -   u   = X   =   ECM t t t t t t b ˆ
¢
                                (11)
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(12)the capital stock (i.e. log-difference of the capital stock). We wanted to see, whether there was any
effect on the results from taking the capital stock as an I(2)-process (see fn. 36). Test results do in-
dicate that the cointegration rank is one and the unrestricted estimates of the components of the
cointegration vector are now much smaller. The original estimates are, as argued earlier, probably a
little too large (in absolute terms), so the present ones appear to imply a move to the right direction.
Weak exogeneity tests suggest that the growth rate of the capital stock is weakly exogenous - the p-
value is 0.229 - and there is now stronger evidence also of the weak exogeneity of real wages; the p-
value is 0.329 for the weak exogeneity of the growth rate of the capital stock and real wages jointly.
Adding the terms of trade to list results, once again, in the p-value dropping sharply to p = 0.1. Fi-
nally, these results did not change much, when we added two impulse dummies - corresponding to
1989.1 and 1990.1 - to control for the observed ARCH-type behaviour of the growth rate of the
capital stock observed also earlier in the context of the unit root tests (see fn. 37). Evidence in fa-
vour of the weak exogeneity of the capital stock and real wages (and perhaps also of the terms of
trade) is slightly stronger in this case.
2.2  Results for New Zealand
This section is only a summary as our focus is on the Nordic countries.  The full explanation is to be
found in Mayes and Vilumnen (1998). Semi-annual data were not available for New Zealand, so
that the empirical analysis is conducted using annual data over the period 1960 - 1995. This implies
that there are fewer observations available than in the Finnish case, even though the time span of the
sample is the same. Also, because of time aggregation, caution must be exercised when making
comparisons with results from the Finnish data. The New Zealand data also present some problems
in interpretation and require caution in assuming the appropriate order of integration. Again only
one cointegrating vector is found.  The ordering of the variables in the estimated cointegration vec-
tor is different from the one used for Finland. The reason is that the data seem to suggest that terms
of trade, in particular, is error correcting, i.e. changes in the terms of trade constitute an important
short-run dynamic channel whereby the New Zealand economy adjusts to shocks.
2.3                The two countries compared
For Finland the data seem to suggest a model, where the capital stock is taken as (weakly) exoge-
nous to the long-run parameters, i.e. the capital stock is not error correcting w.r.t. shocks to the
cointegration relationship, which can be regarded as an unemployment relationship. At conven-
tional significance levels at least, formal tests indicate that we could also take real wages and terms
of trade as (weakly) exogenous. Since we are primarily interested how the burden of adjustment to
shocks to the unemployment relationship is distributed across unemployment, real wages and terms
of trade in countries like Finland and New Zealand, we will focus on the relevant error correction
representations of the cointegrated system of variables. In the Finnish case, we have from (12)
where a zero factor loading has been imposed on the capital stock, k.
Equation (13) suggests that the bulk of the short-run adjustment to a shock to the unemployment
relation falls on unemployment. The speed of adjustment of unemployment is also relatively fast,
whereas real wages and perhaps also terms of trade adjust only sluggishly; unemployment will ad-
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(13)relationship (e.g. a permanent fall in the capital stock), while the adjustment speed of real wages is
as low as 0.01 percentage points per 6 months. In the light of evidence from other studies of the
flexibility of wages to unemployment, this point estimate may be towards the low end of the range
of estimates obtained
24.
The finding that real wages are only mildly error correcting may be associated with real wage rigid-
ity which, together with slightly stronger error correction on the terms of trade, in turn could be re-
lated to the wage formation under centralised wage bargaining and fixed exchange rates with fairly
regular devaluations that characterised Finland over much of the period.  It may be extremely diffi-
cult to achieve real wage adjustments, in the face of adverse shocks to employment, through nomi-
nal wage cuts in a ‘corporatist economy’ like Finland.
Finland, along with other Nordic countries, has often been considered as an archetype of social cor-
poratism, i.e. an economic system whose labour market is characterised by two basic features: i)
centralised wage bargaining and ii) formal or informal involvement of the government economic
and social policies in the process (Pekkarinen et al. 1992, p. 2; see also Vartiainen 1995). In Finland
the wage bargaining process has typically been a two- or three tier process, with a centralised
agreement, an agreement signed by industrial unions and the corresponding employers’ associations
and adjustments at the plant or firm level agreed by the workers’ and employers’ representatives. In
the successive tiers after the centralised agreement, there is strong bias towards positive wage drift,
which has not always been fully anticipated at the central level. Unions tend to improve upon the
central agreement, and plant level applications usually involve (options for) positive adjustments to
union level wage rates (see also Vartiainen 1995, pp. 4-6).  Holden (1991) has formally proven -
using Nash bargaining theory - that the existence of collective agreements changes the threat points
of wage bargains at the lower level of bargaining in a way that generates positive wage drift. Fur-
thermore this multi-tier scheme tends to work better in an environment with some inflation, since
when inflation is low, some nominal wages may need to be cut to achieve a given aggregate out-
come.
Devaluations of the domestic currency in bad times - trying to counteract a fall in the price level -
contribute to making nominal wage cuts unnecessary. The implications here is, thus, that real wage
flexibility in Finland, if there has been any, has been at least partly the result of monetary and ex-
change rate policy. There is an empirical content in this claim - more corporatist economies have
‘softer’ exchange rate policies - and it certainly qualifies the interpretation of the Calmfors - Driffill
‘smile’ (Calmfors and Driffill 1988; see also Pohjola 1992). Tabellini’s analysis of discretionary
monetary policy equilibria under centralised wage setting could probably provide a formal setting
for the analysis of this claim (Tabellini 1988, pp. 105-6).  It could be argued that Austria is a clear
exception but Austria is also an exception in the sense that it has not performed so well in terms of
(changes in) employment.  Although its record seems to be good in terms of (changes in) unem-
ployment (see e.g. Pohjola 1992, pp. 51 -52, graphs 3.3 - 3.6).
This distribution of the burden of adjustment has important policy implications, because not only
does unemployment display substantial hysteresis, which tends to make shocks to unemployment
highly persistent, but the low (endogenous) response of wages and the terms of trade to labour mar-
ket shocks provides a very weak cushion against unemployment increases in the presence of ad-
verse shocks. The low response of real wages contributes to making unemployment increasingly
exposed to shocks; i.e. increases the likelihood of poor unemployment performance of the economy
in the presence of adverse shocks. This, in turn, contributes to the possibility of sharp increases and
subsequently low convergence of the unemployment rate. Since the factor loadings depend on a va-
riety of institutional and structural features of the labour market
25, this implies policy efforts should
be directed to those reforms that, in addition to measures that potentially reduce hysteresis in unem-
ployment, redistribute the burden of short-run adjustment away from unemployment. This involves,
inter alia, increasing the unemployment responsiveness of real wages in the economy
26.the point of view of labour market adjustment, because uncertainty in the parameter estimates, in
particular of the factor loadings, appears to be larger than for Finland. It is also more difficult be-
cause the evidence in the data in favour of a long-term unemployment equation seems to be much
weaker than for Finland. Furthermore, comparison with the result from the Finnish data is compli-
cated by the fact that the New Zealand data are annual.
Although there is strong evidence in favour of cointegration among the terms of trade, real con-
sumption wages, rate of unemployment and capital stock in the data from New Zealand, with the
hypothesis of cointegration only among the subset of variables decisively rejected by the data, re-
sults from weak exogeneity tests indicate that we have essentially estimated a long-term ‘terms of
b=Xt = qt + 0.14ut + 0.73wt - 0.37kt with the associated loading matrix a
= (-1.09, -0.13, -0.13, 0)¢ from the data. Hence, the data appear to suggest that the error correction
form of the cointegrated system for New Zealand is
Formally, the sample may just be too small and, hence, the estimated factor loadings too imprecise
for us to be able to infer the correct VECM. However, some observations are warranted on the basis
of the estimated VECM in (14). First of all, as noted earlier, the unemployment rate in New Zealand
has swung sharply during the last 10 - 15 years: from 4 % in 1984 to 11 % in 1992 while it is cur-
rently around 7 %. Hence, as these figures indicate labour market adjustment through unemploy-
ment can be sizable; whether it is 1.9 percentage points p.a. for a unit shock to the long-run equilib-
rium, as the unrestricted loading estimates indicate is another matter. Formal tests indicate that, un-
der r = 1 and weakly exogenous capital stock, one can reduce the factor loading of the (growth of
the) unemployment rate by as much as 1.5 percentage point without essentially no reduction in the
test statistic.
Second, the numerical estimates of the factor loadings in (14) (and in the unrestricted case) indicate
larger factor loading on real wages than in Finland. Hence, real wages appear to be more strongly
error correcting in New Zealand than in Finland. This means that the rate of convergence of real
wages to the long-run equilibrium is more rapid in New Zealand than in Finland
27.
Third, terms of trade movements appear to be an important adjustment channel to shocks to the
long-run equilibrium in the New Zealand economy. As we have noted, formal tests decisively re-
jected the hypothesis that the terms of trade is weakly exogenous to the parameters of the long-run
equilibrium. In the context of a sticky price model, like the one in Section 2, nominal exchange rate
movements are perhaps the most important single source of terms of trade movements in an open
economy, and this ‘sticky price logic’ may actually explain the signs of the estimated coefficients in
the cointegrating vector, with the capital stock capturing important supply side effects on the nomi-
nal value of the New Zealand currency
28. Furthermore, the rate of convergence of the terms of trade
to the long-run equilibrium is rapid and certainly faster than in Finland.
We thus see two very different labour markets but both seem to have coherence over the period as a
whole. As noted by Chapple, Harris and Silverstone (1996) New Zealand adjusted quite flexibly
even before the reform programme of the last fifteen years.  Finland on the other hand did not adjust
readily even when it had a floating exchange rate.  It will therefore need new mechanisms if it is to
respond more flexibly under Stage 3 of EMU.  However, experience of the last year suggests that it
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(14)the new market pressures from membership of the euro area are anticipated.  Thus, while it may be
too early to identify structural breaks, they may become obvious with time.  Centralised bargaining
may permit more flexible wage adjustment in monetary union.  The lesson from both countries may
turn out to be that institutional change outside the labour market can nevertheless have a clear effect
on the way the labour market adjusts to external shocks.
3  EMU  and the structure of wage bargaining
We saw in the previous section that New Zealand and Finland exhibit very different labour market
characteristics.  If Finnish unemployment is to continue to fall at recent rates then Finland will ei-
ther have to continue receive a sequence of favourable shocks under EMU or its labour market be-
haviour will have to change.  To some extent EMU in itself is providing such favourable shocks.
Real interest rates are already clearly below the levels that would have been likely without EMU.
The euro has fallen in value and assisted Finland’s continued export growth, particularly in highly
competitive industries such as electronics.  A second question we now address is whether the par-
ticular structure chosen for the ECB will tend to help the adjustment of the euro countries given the
structure of their wage bargaining systems.  We therefore need on the one hand to decide whether
the institutional structure of the ECB itself will tend to offer a more promising environment for the
reduction of unemployment than its predecessor national central banks. On the other, our particular
interest is whether countries with a centralised and co-ordinated bargaining system like Finland may
be able to continue to drive down unemployment relative to the euro average. More than that
whether they can respond more flexibly to symmetric shocks than some other euro countries. In
other words a much wider concern than just the popular question of whether they can respond to
asymmetric shocks with limited cost.
Many studies have empirically tested whether higher central bank independence is related to mac-
roeconomic performance in OECD countries with fairly robust observation that inflation is nega-
tively correlated with the measures of legal independence of the central bank. However, the evi-
dence that having independent and conservative central banker is like having a free lunch, that is, an
increased central bank independence has actually translated into a better credibility, is inconclusive.
Different legal measures of central bank independence seem not to be correlated with output or em-
ployment volatility as predicted by the standard credibility model of monetary policy. Parkin
(1987), Grilli et al. (1991), Alesina and Summers (1993) show that higher central bank independ-
ence yields lowered inflation without costs in output. Posen (1994), Debelle and Fischer (1994), in
turn, show that higher central bank independence has not translated into lowered costs of disinfla-
tion. This has been seen as evidence against the credibility arguments. It is thus not immediately
clear from this evidence what the establishment of the ECB will itself offer for unemployment just
from its more independent structure.
Furthermore, the debate on monetary policy has somewhat ignored the role of the private sector in
successful monetary policy and inflation control. Although there is another line of inquiry where the
private sector's behaviour, the management of wage setting in particular, has been seen as a major
element in successful economic policy.
29
Instead of the government ‘tying its hands’ in economic policies, as suggested in the standard credi-
bility literature, this literature suggests that flexible full employment policies (demand management)
are crucial in facilitating a co-operation between labour and capital. Bruno and Sachs (1985) sug-
gest that the relationship between centralisation of wage bargaining, unemployment performance
and wage restraint is positive and linear, implying that a more centralised wage setting system
would yield a superior macroeconomic performance. In contrast, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and
Freeman (1988) demonstrate that extremes perform the best. In other words, either a highly cen-
tralised system with national bargaining or a highly decentralised system with a wage setting at the
level of individual firms perform better than with and an industry level bargaining structure
(Calmfors, 1988). More recent empirical evidence, however, has produced rather mixed resultssive.
Our basic argument is that monetary and labour market institutions interact in the delivery of suc-
cessful macroeconomic policy. Indeed, some attempts have already been made to combine the de-
bate on the centralisation of wage bargaining and central bank independence.
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gues that theoretically inflation performance should not depend upon the characteristics of wage
bargaining but only on the monetary regime and central bank independence, while unemployment
should depend both on the central bank independence and the wage bargaining structure. However,
Akhand (1992), Cubit (1993) and Skott (1995) show that inflation performance should also be con-
ditional on the wage bargaining structure. Skott (1995) also shows theoretically that if also the un-
ions are inflation averse, countries may perform well despite a central bank's concern on output.
There are few empirical studies that combine these different aspects. Cukierman and Lippi (1998)
suggest that when the central bank independence in moderate, there is a clear hump-shaped rela-
tionship between unemployment and centralisation of wage bargaining. Their evidence also shows
that the inflation-reducing impact of central bank independence is largest when centralisation of
wage bargaining is an intermediate level.
Bleaney (1996) and Iversen (1998) have tested empirically some of the implications of this litera-
ture. While Bleaney (1996) confirms his theoretical findings, Iversen (1998) shows that unemploy-
ment performance depends upon degree of discretion of monetary policy as well as the degree of
centralisation of wage bargaining.
3.1  Modelling Central Bank Structures
Most of the existing attempts at the systematic characterisation of central bank independence and
empirical studies rely on legal aspects of independence, such as Alesina (1993), Grilli, Masciandaro
and Tabellini(1991), Cukierman (1992) and Eijffinger and Schaling (1995). The concept of inde-
pendence used also in our empirical analysis proxies the legal independence that is considered to be
an essential component of actual independence. The legal independence inherently suggests what is
the degree of independence that legislators meant to confer on central bank. (Cukierman (1992))
According to Hasse (1990) central bank independence relates to three areas in which the influence
of government must be either excluded or cushioned. Those prominent areas are independence in
personnel matters, financial independence, and independence with respect to policy. Personnel in-
dependence refers to the influence the government has in the appointment procedures of the gov-
erning board of the central bank. Financial independence refers to the limitations on lending from
the bank to the public. Policy independence refers to the manoeuvring room given to the central
bank in the formulation and execution of monetary policy. The policy independence can be further
classified according to goal and instrument independence, as suggested by Debelle and Fischer
(1994), Eijffinger and De Haan (1996).
Table 1 shows some summary indices of the central bank independence that have been used in the
recent literature. Comparison between different indices is a fairly difficult task due to the different
methods of assessing independence of the central banks. While Alesina, Grilli et al. and Eijffinger
and Schaling use a rather crude measure, Cukierman's and modified index of Cukierman developed
in this paper (KICBI), facilitate ranking of the countries in more detail. In order to facilitate graphi-
cal comparison, we have standardised different indices in Fig. 1 and ranked them according to
KICBI index. Moreover, we have calculated Spearman's rank correlation between Cukierman's and
our own index as well as between Alesina, Eijffinger and Schaling and Grilli et al.
Fig. 2 shows fairly substantial differences between the ranking of countries according to different
indices. However, rank correlations in table 2. show that indices are reasonably highly correlated.
Differences are due to the differences in measurement methods as well due to the high subjectivity
in the assessment of central bank laws. For instance, Grilli et al. assess the (political) independence
of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand as the least independent, while Cukierman and Kilponen ranktween the central banks that have been ranked the most independent, such as US, Switzerland and
Germany.
Most commonly used summary indices of legal independence of the central banks, such as those
presented in the table 1, might not provide an comprehensive measure of actual central bank inde-
pendence. For instance, when studying a link between the central bank independence and the budget
deficits, the most important factor is financial independence. When judging the relationship be-
tween inflation and central bank independence, the political independence may play the most im-
portant role. Often a lack of, say, goal independence and personnel independence has been supple-
mented by the instrument independence, as in the case of New Zealand and other inflation targeting
countries (Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996). Sometimes, a lack of, say, financial independence may
mitigate the political independence as in the case of the Bank of Italy. Therefore, in empirical
analysis, one should control for the different forms of legal independence and not to use only the
highly aggregated summary measures of legal independence.
Moreover, existing indices of legal independence are often incomplete and noisy indicators of ac-
tual independence and subject to subjectivity bias, as noted by Mangano (1998). This subjectivity
bias is judged by comparing the values attributed on common legal characteristics of central banks
by Grilli et al. and Cukierman. In general, Mangano finds that Cukierman and Grilli et al. disagree
nearly 60% of countries when deciding whether the central bank is legally allowed to purchase gov-
ernment debts in the primary markets or not. Virtually a third of the values attributed to their com-
mon criteria seem to be subject to conflicting interpretations. In addition, as noted by Eijffinger and
de Haan (1996), Cukierman attributes an incorrect value to five out of the 16 characteristics by
which he measures the legal independence of the Dutch central bank. However, Cukierman's index
contains the largest set of countries and is perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to assess legal
independence. For instance, Grilli et al. index excludes all the Scandinavian countries, that are of
substantial interest in our study and separates a form of independence only into two categories; fi-
nancial and economic independence.
Consequently, although the indices of legal aspects of central bank independence and their coding
used in our empirical analysis are based closely on Cukierman's (1992) indices, our measure of fi-
nancial independence differs from Cukierman (1992). We have also reassessed the independence of
the Dutch Central bank and corrected the values following Eijffinger and de Haan. We also account
for the adoption of inflation targeting, by constructing a dummy for those countries that adopted
inflation targeting, as well as for the recent changes in central bank laws. Corresponding changes
and their effect on the legal independence are explained in appendix table III.1. Table 1 summarises
effects of those changes on an overall legal independence of the central banks and highlights the
countries that have adopted explicit inflation targets towards the end of 1996. This allows us to ex-
tend the time period until 1996 and study the effects of these important changes on macroeconomic
performance. The legal independence considers 3 different periods, 1972-9, 1980-9, and 1990-6, so
that the legal variables of the central bank independence are coded separately for each subperiod.
Given that OECD countries have adopted different practices in securing the legal independence of
their central banks, it is interesting compare these different forms of independence according to our
measures. We have therefore ranked the countries according to each political independence, per-
sonnel independence, financial independence and importance of price objective in the status of the
central banks and produced a Spearman rank correlation between different forms of independence
during 1980-1989 and 1990-1996. Apparently, also these indices capture substantial differences in
the ranking of the countries according to different forms of independence. This is evident from fig.
2 and Table 3 below.
Fig. 2 reveals that some forms of legal independence are relatively loosely linked to each others.
This loose link is also quantified in table 3 by rank correlations. In general, while the financial in-
dependence and the importance of price objective in the status of the central bank seem to beinteresting to note that for instance the Danish central bank seems to have very high political and
financial independence, while no personnel independence. A similar kind of substantial difference
appears also in the case of Canada, the Netherlands and Finland. On the contrary, the Bundesbank is
ranked as having a very high independence according to all variables. Consequently, in many coun-
tries, there exist a degree of uncertainty with regard to legal independence of the central banks and
it seems that the governments have nevertheless attempted to maintain some channel for discretion
on their central banks.
The ECB does not feature in these comparisons as it did not exist at the time but the ECB will be
given a complete political independence as well as goal and instrument independence. The ECB
will have freedom on the monetary policy instruments to pursue price stability bound only by the
principle of respecting market laws. It can set its own inflation goal, consistent with the requirement
of price stability. The ECB will announce publicly a quantified definition of price stability. Moreo-
ver, due to the appointment and dismiss procedures the members of the ECB board do not have po-
litical accountability. The ECB is prohibited from taking or seeking instructions from other bodies
to the long-term appointment and political bodies has no possibility of renew board members. A
different question is, how the ECB can monitor its own actions and enforce itself to maintain price
stability. The question is, literally, how can one tie its own hands. There are few assessments of its
position in the spectrum but that by Castren (1998) suggests that by most of the measures consid-
ered here the ECB will be right towards the upper limit of independence shown by existing national
central banks.  Indeed its relatively low level of formal accountability may put it in a new category
of its own.
3.2  Modelling Wage Bargaining Structures
At the beginning of the 1980s, a vast political economy literature concentrated on the macroeco-
nomic consequences of various wage-bargaining systems. It was thought that wage bargaining
structure could explain part of the dispersion of macroeconomic performance in advanced industri-
alised countries. In particular, some wage bargaining systems were seen to have higher wage re-
straint.
One of the starting points of this literature was in Bruno & Sachs (1985) who argued that
‘A real wage moderation is a key to achieving low inflation and low unemployment af-
ter a supply shocks.  …In countries with near-universal union coverage and highly cen-
tralised negotiations (for example Austria and Sweden) it seems that wages were kept
closer to market clearing levels than in more decentralised systems (such as the United
Kingdom)’
That is, the relationship between centralisation, unemployment performance and wage restraint
seemed to be linear, implying that a more centralised wage setting system would yield a higher
wage restraint and thus lower unemployment rates.
In contrast, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and Freeman (1988) demonstrated that extremes perform
the best. In other words, either a highly centralised system with a national bargaining or a highly
decentralised systems with a wage setting at the level of individual firms perform better than those
with an industry level bargaining structure. Calmfors (1988) explained this by the idea of Olson
(1965) who stated that an organised interest may be most harmful when they are strong enough to
cause major disruptions but not sufficiently encompassing to bear any significant fraction of the
costs for society of their actions in their own interest. (Olson, 1965).
The first view emphasises the fact that a high degree of centralisation guarantees that wage setters
recognise broader interests. According to this view, institutional arrangements exist to overcome
various market failures and may therefore benefit economic performance. This view has been criti-
cised by the insider-outsider view, according to which union officials may not bear enough concern
on outsiders mitigating the possibility of union officials ‘recognise a broader interest’.
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only harm economic performance.
The Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis supported the view that the degree of centralisation of union
power is the central attribute that determines union behaviour and its impact on the national econ-
omy. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) constructed an index of centralisation by assessing the co-
ordination level within national union confederations and within national employer organisations
and the existence of parallel central organisations and their co-operation. Centralisation is then, in
fact, defined and measured by the extent of co-operation between different unions and employer
organisations in wage bargaining.
However, Golden (1993) emphasises the coercive authority of central confederations over its affili-
ates (unions). The degree of centralisation and the level at which bargaining predominantly takes
place depends on the institutional conditions such as the extent to which national confederations
(peak organisations) have authority over its unions. The coercive authority appears as the extent to
which the peak organisations are able to set wage demands, sanction strikes action and generally
disperse union resources. The difference between Golden's definition and Calmfors and Driffill's
definition is that she defines centralisation as the formal centralisation of authority between unions
and their peak organisations, while Calmfors and Driffill considered centralisation from a broader
perspective, combining formal centralisation and co-operation. (Golden, 1993)
The basic insight of Golden's (1993) analysis is that the centralisation of authority may not be
enough to secure sustained wage moderation and better economic performance. This is because the
binding/coercive authority that central confederations hold over their affiliates is ultimately volun-
tary and thus this authority is more likely to rest on bargaining and agreement among the parties.
According to the OECD(1997) report, the fact that in highly centralised wage bargaining countries
wages tend to drift supports this argument. Because the extent of co-ordination and formal authority
are separate independent features of wage bargaining and may evolve in a different direction over
time, it may not be appropriate to combine these under the same heading, as in the Calmfors and
Driffill index.
Given this conceptual difficulty with defining centralisation, Golden (1993) argues that a lack of co-
operation that is potentially harmful for the aggregate economy can be solved even without the for-
mal authority of confederations, provided that institutional conditions facilitate the co-ordination of
bargaining strategies among unions. This view, primarily due to the Lange (1984) and Wallerstein
(1990), emphasises the collective action problem affecting union behaviour. According to this line
of argument co-operation among workers and among unions may be difficult to achieve, because of
free riding problems. The idea is that even if workers and unions collectively prefer wage restraint,
it is in no individual worker's or union's interest to do so. This idea has been formalised for instance
in monopolistic competition models. Also Soskice (1990) emphasises the role of co-ordination
separately from the formal degree of centralisation and shows that the hump-shaped relationship
between a wage restraint and a degree of centralisation disappears when the degree of co-ordination
is evaluated separately from centralisation.
The possibility for co-ordination, in turn, is likely to rest on two factors:
(i) The number of national-level actors involved in the wage setting process.
(ii) The degree of competition among them
The first indicates the unconditional likelihood that labour is able to overcome internal co-
ordination problems and the second the likelihood that it resolves internal distributional conflicts.
When the number of unions that participate in the wage bargaining is small, unions can monitor and
assess their own and each other's behaviour in the bargaining process, thus reducing the uncertain-
ties that can be harmful in the wage bargaining process. The second refers to the fact, that not alltors involved; inter- and intra union relations are characterised by genuine conflicts of interest as
well. The problem of competition, in turn, can be eased by demarcating non-overlapping union ter-
ritories and thus, reducing the competition from members. When fewer but larger unions set wages
for larger groups of workers the visibility and organisational importance for workers of relative
wages can be increased. These together should moderate wage demands, reduce inflationary pres-
sure and help to maintain high employment.
More centralised and co-ordinated wage bargaining institutions promote credence of monetary pol-
icy due to their better ability to co-ordinate and asses the behaviour of the others. This is because in
the centralised and co-ordinated wage setting systems possibly harmful uncertainty on the actions of
the others is reduced, when compared with the wage bargaining systems where several competing
unions are involved. On the other hand, possibility that sufficiently centralised wage bargaining in-
stitutions use their monopoly power, leading to higher wage inflation, may mitigate the effect of
this higher credence. In the face of decentralised wage setting institutions, in turn, the monetary
policy may suffer a lack of credence, but the ultimate question is, whether a lack of credence out-
weighs the benefit from reasonably well functioning and flexible market mechanism in wage set-
ting. It is therefore important to note that the degree of centralisation and the degree of co-operation
of wage bargaining are conceptually different issues in the context of credence as well. The critical
point is that while the higher degree of co-ordination should inevitably promote this credence and
improve macroeconomic performance, the higher degree of centralisation may work in the opposite
direction. This is due to the fact that a higher degree of centralisation inevitably increases the mar-
ket power of the unions.
Also Golden (1993) refers to this same phenomenon by ‘visibility’, which inherently decreases un-
certainties about the actions of the others in the wage bargaining process. However, Golden (1993)
does not notice that an increased centralisation may lead higher wages, due to the exploitation of
market power. We turn to this after considering the measurement of co-ordination and centralisation
of wage bargaining.
Unfortunately, no simple or even comprehensive combination of measures exists that would ac-
count for all these factors. The best available source for the date is OECD (1997), where the
Calmfors-Driffill (1988) index has been extended. OECD (1997) evaluates the degree of formal
centralisation in wage bargaining separately from co-ordination. Table 2 below reproduces these
figures.
From Table 2 we can see that the degree of centralisation and co-operation are quite closely related.
However, interesting exceptions are those where the degree of centralisation has been higher than
the degree of co-ordination. This was the case in Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, New Zealand,
Spain, Sweden and the U.K. during the 1980s, while the situation remained similar only in the U.K
in 1994. These countries may represent the most unfavourable bargaining systems, since in these
countries the market power of the unions has been considerable, while the likelihood for inter- and
intra union conflicts of interest perhaps the greatest. In all other countries, the degree of co-
operation has been at least as large as the degree of centralisation. The difference between centrali-
sation and co-operation is particularly large in Austria, Germany and Japan. In those countries in-
dustry level or decentralised wage bargaining systems seem to be characterised by genuine co-
operation. We should expect this to improve the performance of these systems.
Ultimately wage bargaining is a process of decision making between the parties representing em-
ployer and employee interests. The key element in the decision making process between union and
employer is the ability of both sides to halt production. The firm's power depends on the right to
lockout or fire, while the union's power depends on the right to organise and strike. Formally, the
external power of the unions and confederations is upheld by a statute and therefore it is more than
likely that institutional conditions play a dominant role in the wage setting game between the firms
and unions (Layard, 1991; Soskice,1990).Jackman et al. (1991) have analysed the issue in a simple model of bargaining between unions and
firms. Under reasonable assumptions, the rise in union power leads to relative wage increases and a
fall in aggregate employment. An increase in union coverage increases union employment and total
employment rises. However, if the supply in the competitive sector is elastic enough, a rise in union
coverage depresses the competitive sector wages and leads to fall in employment. This result is in-
creasingly likely the nearer one is to complete unionisation. (In general, over most relevant ranges
an increase in coverage reduces total employment.)
Conceptually, external union power is a complex matter and thus difficult to assess. Often, union
density, which is the proportion of eligible employees who become union members, has been con-
sidered as an initial but fundamental measure of union power. Union coverage, instead, is often in
effect larger than the union density because statutory and other requirements extend the collec-
tively-bargained wage to non-union employees. Union coverage is perhaps a more accurate measure
of the extent to which unions affect wage levels than union density and for this reason maybe also
more accurate measure of union power. In the empirical analysis, however, it turns out that neither
the density nor the coverage rates alone can explain inflation, wage growth or unemployment. The
reason is that union density nor union coverage as such does not tell anything about the actual mo-
nopoly power of the individual unions. The density and coverage can be high even in reasonable
decentralised and non-co-operative wage bargaining systems as can be seen by comparing table 2
and Table 3.
We therefore propose an alternative measure of union power by multiplying the degree of centrali-
sation and union density (MOPO). This measure of monopoly power of the unions takes into ac-
count the fact that in more centralised wage bargaining systems, a high density promotes monopoly
power, while in highly decentralised systems high density does not secure monopoly power of the
individual union.
From Table 3 we can see that the rates of union coverage and union density differ across countries
by wide margins. This is evident from only a modest positive correlation (r = 0.32)
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two rates. Several groups of countries can be identified. First, there is a group - Canada, Japan and
United States - with below average coverage and unionisation with little difference between them.
Another group - Finland, Norway and Sweden, features very high unionisation and coverage rates
with a relatively modest difference between them. The most interesting are perhaps the countries
with considerable differences between the two. The gap is especially wide in France, but also sig-
nificant in countries such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy.
A large difference between density and coverage rates may reflect the organisational weakness of
the labour movement and intra-union conflicts, which are then compensated by political decisions
of extension laws and statutory arrangements or by genuine co-operation of employer organisations.
A likelihood that intra-union conflicts lead into wage rivalry is perhaps higher when compared to
systems with more uniform density and coverage rates. Moreover, if the union membership gives an
insider advantage for the members per se, the non-union members do not enter into wage consid-
erations in the wage bargaining process. This can lead into "too high" wage demands and exploita-
tion of insider advantage. In order to assess importance of large differences between these two rates,
we constructed a new variable by subtracting union density from the union coverage (DICODE).
The higher the value, higher the likelihood of free rider problems. In the empirical analysis, this
variable partially explains the dispersion in wage growth and unemployment rates in OECD coun-
tries.
3.3 The model
In order to assess the statistical significance of these institutional structures and reforms, we esti-
mated a cross-section-time-series model for inflation, nominal wage growth and unemployment
rates. In contrast with other studies of this kind, we estimate a fully specified econometric model,We also account for endogeneity of the regressors and use specification tests to compare between
different models. The endogeneity problem arises from the fact that inflation, wage growth and un-
employment are jointly determined.
Primarily, our interest is to test whether, and how, inclusion of wage bargaining variables together
with different measures of central bank independence discussed above helps to explain variation in
macroeconomic performance in OECD countries during the period of 1973-96. We are also inter-
ested in whether the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis of hump-shaped relationship between wage
growth and the degree of centralisation on the one hand and unemployment and the degree of cen-
tralisation on the other hand, gets support from the data. This section presents and discusses the re-
sults.
We estimated the following equation for each of price inflation, wage inflation and unemployment
(Portugal, Greece and Ireland were excluded from the estimated models due to lack of data).
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Where  it y  refers to dependent variable, it x  economic variables, b to corresponding parameters,  it Z
to institutional variables, l to corresponding parameter vector,  t g  common time effects and finally
it u  to error term. Index i refers to countries(cross-sections) and  t to time.
The endogeneity problem related to economic variables was accounted for by instrumental variable
estimation. Lagged values of explanatory economic variables were used as instruments. Institutional
variables were not included into the instrument equation, in order to avoid orthogonality between
instrumented regressors and institutional variables. Finally, we used growth rates of each country as
an additional instrument.
The lagged dependent variable was included into the model in order to remove serial correlation
from the errors. A lagged dependent variable also captures the dynamic adjustment, since dependent
variables exhibit a substantial degree of persistence in each equation. Serial correlation of the errors
was then tested by a Lagrange Multiplier test Lmr (Baltagi, 1995, p. 92, eq. (5.38)). In the models
for price inflation and wage growth, a lagged dependent variable and other explanatory economic
variables were able to remove serial correlation from the errors. In the case of unemployment it was
necessary to include the lagged change in unemployment and other economic variables as well.
33
Time effects ( t g ) were also included into the model, when appropriate. These time effects are
country-invariant and account for any time-specific effects not included in the regression, such as
oil shocks. Time effects can also mimic the general trend in the dependent variables, such as de-
clining world inflation. Time effects in the errors was then tested by a Lagrange Multiplier test
(LMg), (Baltagi, 1995, eq. (4.42)). The model misspecification was tested by testing whether indi-
vidual effects should be included into errors. Again a Lagrange Multiplier test (LMm), (Baltagi,
1995, eq.(4.38)), was used. Finally the possibility that errors were correlated and heteroskedastic
across countries was tested by a Likelihood Ratio test, comparing the restricted and unrestricted
model. The model specification was accepted when the model passed all these specification tests.
Normality of the errors was also assessed using the test statistic. None of the models passed this
test, however. This is not surprising, given the data at hand, since outliers are highly likely. A l-
though OLS estimation was used to estimate parameters of interest, robust standard errors were cal-
culated following the method of Beck and Katz (1995).
After these two estimation rounds, we run instrumental variable regressions for each price inflation,
wage growth and unemployment without the labour market variables. Our idea was to test whetherwhich tested jointly whether errors contained significant individual effects and whether the errors
were serially correlated, tested this misspecification from the partial model (LMr,m), Baltagi (1995,
eq. (5.36).). In addition, we used a Wald test to test for joint significance of the labour market vari-
ables in the fully specified model. Finally, also the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis was tested by a
Wald test from fully specified model. The estimates and hypothesis tests are summarised in Tables
5 and 6 respectively.
Our model for inflation suggests that the importance of price stability objective in the status of the
central bank (OBJE), which proxies the conservativeness bias of the central bank was not related to
inflation significantly. The political independence of the central bank, however, appeared signifi-
cant and negatively related to inflation. This seems to imply that conservativeness of the central
bank per se does not secure moderate inflation. Granting political independence for the central bank
seems to be decisive for moderate inflation rate. Inflation seemed to be negatively related to the de-
gree of co-operation and positively to the power of the unions. A higher degree of co-operation
seems to moderate inflation, as expected, while a larger power of unions leads higher inflation. Also
the inflation targeting dummy appeared negatively related to inflation at 5.2% significance level.
This seems to imply that countries that adopted inflation targeting were able achieve moderate in-
flation level faster than those following traditional approaches. Most likely this implies that an idea
to substitute a lack of legal independence by the full instrument independence was successful. All
these results are, again, in line with theory, but they emphasise that moderate inflation rates are
conditional not only on the legal independence of the central bank, but also on wage bargaining
structure. The bottom line is, then, that it may not be sufficient to secure credibility of the central
bank by granting legal independence for the central bank. Structural reforms in the wage bargaining
practice may be necessary. Our results hint a need either to increase the co-operation in wage bar-
gaining or decrease the power of the unions.
Indeed, the Lagrange Multiplier test statistic shows that omitting labour market variables from the
regression leads into a mis-specified model. Moreover, the Wald test statistic for omitting the labour
market variables rejects the hypothesis that labour market variables are insignificant (table 6).
Contrary to inflation model, and somewhat surprisingly, importance of the price objective in the
status of the central bank had a significant negative effect on nominal wage growth in the model for
wages. In addition, the personnel independence of the central bank has contributed to moderate
wage growth, while the political independence variable was not significant. However, in contrast to
the results on inflation, the inflation targeting dummy, when lagged one period, had a significant
positive effect on nominal wage growth, while inflation targeting dummy without the lag was not
significant. The difference between coverage and density rates and power of the unions had a mar-
ginally significant positive effect on wages.
It is important to note that nominal wage growth seemed to be very closely related to the central
bank independence variables. The fact that the OBJE variable, which proxies the conservativeness
of the central bank, was significant and negative strongly supports the argument that wage bargain-
ing institutions and their beliefs on policymakers preferences play an important role in successful
economic policy. The fact that personnel independence of the central bank was significant and
negative, gives support for the credibility arguments, that granting legal independence of the central
banks increases the credibility of the policymakers and therefore, leads into moderate inflation ex-
pectations.
The Lagrange Multiplier test statistic shows that even if the labour market variables were omitted
from the regression the model specification was accepted. However, the Wald test statistic for
omitting the labour market variables rejects the hypothesis that labour market variables are insig-
nificant. This can be seen from table 6. We also used a Wald test to test the Calmfors-Driffill hy-
pothesis that the relationship between centralisation of wage bargaining and wage growth should be
hump-shaped. Omitting the variable (C-D), which captured this hump-shaped relationship, was notdifference between coverage and density rates), omitting C-D was rejected at the 10% level.
When estimating the model for unemployment the log of the standardised unemployment rates were
used. Interestingly, we found that policy independence had significant negative effect on unem-
ployment. This result seems to be consistent with the finding that wage growth is negatively related
to personnel independence. The degree of co-operation in wage bargaining was negatively related to
unemployment. The difference between coverage and density rates had significant positive effect on
unemployment, when the model was estimated without the quadratic term C-D, capturing the
Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis. When the model was estimated with both variables, only the quadratic
term C-D remained significant. This is due to the fact that these two variables are highly correlated.
The result that policy independence of the central bank leads to moderate inflation and personnel
independence leads to both moderate wage growth and unemployment rate gives a strong support
for the arguments of Cottarelli and Giannini (1997). Namely, it seems that establishing arrange-
ments, which decrease the discretionary power of the government over the central bank but leaves
necessary flexibility for the monetary policy, is desirable. Moreover, because the co-ordination
variable both contributes moderate inflation rates and unemployment rates, it seems likely that in
the co-ordinated wage bargaining systems, this co-ordination has improved the credibility of the
monetary policy.
Similarly with the wage growth equation, a Lagrange Multiplier test statistic shows that the model
specification was accepted even without wage bargaining variables. The Wald test statistic for
omitting the labour market variables, in turn, rejects the hypothesis that labour market variables are
insignificant. This can be seen again from table 6. The Wald test for Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis
was marginally supportive. Omitting the variable (C-D), which captured this hump-shaped relation-
ship, was rejected at 9% significance level.
Our results suggest that the wage bargaining structure and the central bank independence are related
to dispersion of macroeconomic performance in OECD countries in rather complicated fashion. It
seems evident that empirical studies, which have studied these two issues separately have neglected
an important interaction of wage bargaining parties and monetary authorities. This is evident from
the fact that we find much more significant results with respect to wage bargaining structure than
for instance OECD (1997), which abstain from the central bank independence discussion. Our for-
mal tests for this significance most strongly suggested that estimated inflation model without labour
market variables is misspecified.
In the particular case of Finland, the changes in the structure of the central bank involved in moving
from the Bank of Finland and the decision-maker on monetary policy to the ECB are small in the
short run as the two structures were similar in practical terms at the changeover date at the end of
1998.  However, our models cover a much longer period and the change between the ECB now and
the Bank of Finland’s independence over the period as a whole is somewhat larger, see Table 7.
Given the relatively short lags in our model much of this change may have already passed through
its benefit to unemployment.  However, if we take just the interaction between the structure of wage
bargaining and the independence of the ECB we could expect Finland to have below average un-
employment levels, insofar as it has an advantage through the Calmfors-Driffill effect.
However, this has addressed the issues related to the average levels of inflation, nominal wage
growth and unemployment only. The next step is to analyse, whether unemployment variability is
related to these institutional variables.
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1          This analysis forms part of a larger project supported by the UK ESRC under the One Europe or Several
Programme, which considers the efficiency of various regimes in maintaining internal balance in the EU countries.
2 The real interest rate has in fact varied over the period and has affected other variables in the model,
particularly unemployment, as also emphasised by Phelps and Zoega (1998) inter alia.
3 Such a labour supply function can be derived from an underlying (static) constrained utility maximisa-
tion problem, as shown in Mayes and Vilmunen (1998).
4 These non-modelled factors include preference shocks between consumption and leisure, changes in net
immigration, changes in the birth and mortality rates, reservation wages and unemployment and other benefits.
5 Terms of trade usually refers to the price of domestic exports relative to imports in domestic currency.
Hence, it is the relative price associated with tradable goods. The real exchange rate, on the other hand, is often defined
as the ratio of domestic and foreign price levels (in domestic currency). In the context of a single good small open
economy of our model these two coincide. So we use ‘terms of trade’ in the main text to embrace both concepts.
6 The literature on wage indexation (Gray, 1976; Fischer, 1977; Karni, 1983), especially in open econo-
mies (Turnovsky, 1983; Aizenmann and Frenkel, 1985a, b) under optimal wage indexing (Devereux, 1988; Vilmunen,
1992) provides a very useful theoretical background in this context.7 These non-modelled factors include (institutional etc.) parameters related to wage bargaining as well as
various restrictions, such as minimum wage laws, on wage formation. Also, shocks to real interest rates could affect the
stochastic behaviour of shocks to wage formation.
8  We could generalise (6) by letting ‰y‰£1 and retaining the property that gV,t is stationary. In this more
general case, Vt is stationary, but not necessarily an AR(1) process, when ‰y‰ < 1. On the other hand, when ‰y‰ = 1,
Vt is integrated of order 1, I(1), but not necessarily a pure random walk. The main reason for wanting flexibility in the
stochastic structure of the shocks is that the cointegration implications of the model depend on the number of unit roots
in the exogenous stochastic processes. For example, if shocks to wage formation are generated by a random walk and ut
- I(1) and qt- I(1), then the trivariate system Xt =  (wt, ut , qt) cannot be cointegrated (i.e. linear combinations b=Xt in the
present context cannot be I(0)), whereas stationary, mean reverting shocks to wage formation imply cointegration
among these variables. This implication of the wage shock is emphasised also by Jacobson et al. (1996 p. 6).
9 I.e. the underlying IS-schedule is y = -aq + u for some positive a, where u denotes exogenous IS or
aggregate demand shocks, and include fiscal policy shocks, exogenous shocks to consumption and investment etc. Im-
plicitly we are abstracting away from interest rate determination and simply take the real interest rate is as parametri-
cally given.
10 There will be a unique solution, provided the determinant of the Astructural@ matrix linking the four
endogenous variables together in the model structure is non-zero, see Jacobson et al. (1996) for an analogous condition
(p. 5, where they denote the determinant by y).
11 A vector of constants is missing from (8), as we have abstracted from the relevant constants in devel-
oping the theory.
12 Note that according to (9), long-run unemployment need not be independent of shocks to labour de-
mand and supply. Lindbeck (1993) argues that a realistic macroeconomic theory should have long-run unemployment
independent of productivity and labour supply shocks. This is very similar in spirit to the identification scheme used by
Blanchard and Quah  (1987) to identify aggregate demand and supply shocks, and is similar to what Blanchard and
Katz (1996, p. 9) argue. Above, independence will prevail essentially if xt - zt is stationary, which, in the case of unit
roots in labour demand and supply shocks, boils down to xt and zt sharing a common trend. Productivity, or a similar
particular form of technological progress, would probably be the most plausible interpretation of this common trend,
since shocks to productivity would affect not only labour demand, but also labour supply (see e.g. Blanchard and Katz,
1996, pp. 9-10).
13              In general, it is difficult to choose the appropriate periodicity for the data. Quarterly data tend to have a
high level of noise and short-run dynamics can obscure the more fundamental analysis we are concerned with here.
Semi-annual data, however, are much more stable. Since both annual and semi-annual data provide similar outcomes
we report the semi-annual results to minimise any loss of information.
14 The argument that unemployment rate cannot have a unit root, because it is bounded by 0 and 1 - so
that random labour market shocks would drive the unemployment rate to 0 or one with the passage of time (see e.g.
Karanassou and Snower, 1997a, p. 4 fn. 11) - needs qualification. First of all, unemployment rate cannot be an unre-
stricted (linear) random walk or Brownian motion because of the bounds. But it can be regulated Brownian motion (or
even a Brownian bridge). Hence, there can be a unit root in the unemployment rate, but its fluctuations are constrained
by barriers, most plausibly by reflecting barriers, since absorbing barriers would imply that the unemployment rate stays
at a particular level, once it reaches that level.  These barriers can e.g. reflect the internal workings of the economy itself
or they can result from policy regulation. The existence of such barriers raises the possibility of a non-linear relationship
between the unemployment rate and its fundamental determinants. Alternatively, there could be non-linearities in the
process generating observed unemployment - e.g. regime shifts - so that observations on the unemployment rate look
favourable to a unit root, in the context of unit root testing. At a general level, however, the unemployment rate is not
much different from many other economic series, in the sense that these series cannot strictly speaking be modelled as
(symmetric) unrestricted Brownian motion at least because of the existence of non-negativity constraints, which are
typically ignored in the unit root tests of these series. Consumption, output, prices etc. are subject to non-negativity con-
straints and cannot thus be, strictly speaking, modelled as (symmetric) unrestricted Brownian motion. In these circum-
stances ‘unit root econometrics’ is implicitly assumed to give a reasonable basis for statistical inference in the context
of (statistical) modelling these series. A similar line of reasoning is applied in the present context.
15 The unit root test for the terms of trade is in line with (the extensive literature on) testing the validity of
the PPP (purchasing power parity) in the sense that the test here suggests that deviations from the PPP are nonstationary
(see Rogoff, 1995, for an excellent survey on PPP and long-run real exchange rates).
16 The shape of the estimated spectrum for the growth rate of the capital stock also confirms that there is
substantial autocorrelation in the series. The estimated spectrum for the growth of the real wages, on the other hand, is
U-shaped, where the minimum occurs approximately at frequency 3/4, implying that cycles shorter than 1 1/3 years
make a considerable contribution to the variance of the growth rate of real wages.17 Available from the authors upon request.
18 We will return to the possible I(2) of the capital stock in the context of the cointegration analysis, where
the growth rate of the capital stock is also used instead of the log-level. As far as the other diagnostics are concerned,
we checked the outcome from the ADF test by including two impulse dummies in the test equation to mitigate the ef-
fects of the outliers around 1990.  The t-statistics, tb, did generally rise at various lags, even to the extent that at lags 3
and 4, the null of a unit root was rejected at the 5 % significance level. The 10 % critical value for the ADF test (from
McKinnon, 1991), on the other hand, is around -3.1619, which tends to lend support for the rejection of a unit root in
the growth rate of the capital stock, but does not, unfortunately, fully sustain the conclusion in the main text that the
growth rate of the capital stock is (trend) stationary.
19 A battery of specification tests was run on the ECM representation underlying the cointegration analy-
sis. The ECM of the VAR(4) captures most of the observed variation in the growth rates of variables (i.e. Dxt); no resid-
ual autocorrelation is left in the equations; a small ARCH-effect at lag 2 is present in the residuals for the growth rate of
capital, but no more general form of heteroscedasticity can be detected from the residuals. The null of normal residuals,
however, is rejected in the case of the growth rate of unemployment and capital stock. It appears from the graphs of the
residuals that this stems mainly from skewness. The sample distribution of unemployment residuals appears to be
slightly positively skewed due to the sharp increase in the observed unemployment rate in 1990-91. Residuals from the
growth rate of the capital stock appear to be a mirror image of those of the unemployment rate; i.e. their sample distri-
bution is skewed to the left.
20 And hence involves all the parameters of the model.
21 All the subsequent tests are conditional on r = 1, i.e. that the cointegration rank is one.
22 This set up would correspond to our theoretical model with r1 = s1 = 0. Under this assumption, we can
immediately see that wages do not respond to labour demand or technology and labour supply shocks, only to shocks to
wage formation and terms of trade. Since the capital stock is driven by technology shocks and terms of trade by its own
autonomous component and shocks to wage formation, the bulk of the adjustment falls on unemployment in the sense
that it is affected by all sources of shocks.
23 The standardised or reduced form vector is (1.000, -2.856, 1.151, 1.163) and the asymptotic S.E’s are
0.2107, 1.4103, 0.8689 and 0.8409.
24 See e.g. Parjanne (1997). With annual data, real wages appear to fall by 0.1 percentage points after a
one percentage point increase in unemployment.
25 In the context of a different model, Nickell (1997, p. 2) also emphasises the dependence of the
model’s parameters on the institutional features of the labour market.
26 Yet another possibility for the non-responsiveness of real wages to unemployment variations may in-
volve aspects from human capital development during unemployment spells.  The average ability of unemployed
workers falls during unemployment, which, among other things, tends to increase the mismatch between vacancies
and unemployed workers. Hence, anything that reduces the effectiveness of the long-term unemployed as fillers of
vacancies, such as long periods receiving benefit, will tend to lower the responsiveness (Nickell, 1997, p. 2).
27 One factor that may sustain higher wage responsiveness in New Zealand is the benefit reform of 1991,
which, through reduction of benefits, appears to have increased incentives to work and, hence labour market participa-
tion (Maloney 1997).
28 Hansen and Hutchison (1997) find support for such an emphasis on Areal@ determinants of nominal
exchange rates in New Zealand. Their model of the real side of the economy is different from ours.
29  This literature builds on Bruno and Sachs (1985), Cameron (1984), Calmfors (1982,1985, 1988), Crouch
(1985), Freeman (1988), Lindbeck and Snower (1989), Pohjola (1987) and Soskice (1990).
30  See for instance Akhand(1992), Bleaney (1996), Cubit (1993), Skott (1995), Cukierman and Lippi(1998),
Velasco and Guzzo (1998), Iversen (1998).
31  Lawrence and Summers (1988), for instance.
32  This correlation refers to year 1994.
33  Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors results in some collinearity problem between
lagged dependent variable and institutional variables. In order to assess seriousness of this problem we also estimated
the basic model without lagged dependent variables but with an autocorrelation correction for the errors, as suggested
by Park (1967). In this case we assumed that autocorrelation coefficient for each country was the same. In general, the
model specification remained the same, but significance of the institutional effects increased.Table 1.  Inflation Targeting and Indices of Central Bank Independence
Index Alesina G-M-T E-S CUKI KICBI
Country
Australia 1 9,3 1 0.31 0.36
Austria - 9,3 3 0.58 0.59
Belgium 2 7,1 3 0.19 0.07(0.34)
Canada 2 11,4 1 0.46      0.36
Denmark 2 8,3 4 0.47      0.50
Finland 2 - 3 0.27      0.28
France 2 7,2 2 0.28      0.19 (0.66)
Germany 4 13,6 5 0.66 0.65
Greece - 4,2 - 0.51      0.54 (0.62)
Ireland - 7,3 - 0.39      0.60
Italy 1.5 5,4 2 0.22      0.13 (0.33)
(a
Japan 3 6,1 3 0.16      0.14
Netherlands 2 10,6 4 0.42      0.40
New Zealand 1 3,0 3 0.27      0.25 (0.30)
Norway 2 - 2 0.14      0.15
Portugal - 3,1 2        -
Spain 1 5,2 3 0.21      0.32 (0.64)
Sweden 2 - 2 0.27      0.26 (0.44)
Switzerland 4 12,5 5 0.68      0.49
The U.K. 2 6,1 2 0.31      0.20
U.S. 3 12,5 3 0.51      0.48
Notes: Alesina refers to Alesina (1993). G-M-T refers to Grilli, Masciandro, Tabellini (1991). The
first figure is their index of economic independence and the second political independence. E-S
refers to Eijffinger-Schaling (1995), CUKI refers to Cukierman (1992) and to an unweighted index
of legal independence of the central banks (LVAU). Bold figures indicate the countries which
adopted an explicit inflation targeting regime as existed at the end of 1996. The first 4 indices refer
to the period of 1980-89. The first figure in the last column refers to 1980s and the last to 1996. a)
The first figure in KICBI refers to the situation before the divorce between the Treasury and the
Bank of Italy in 1981. Otherwise the first figure refers to 1985. If there is one figure only, there has
not been a change in the statute of the central bank.
Figure 1. Comparison between the Legal Indices of the Central Banks


































Notes: Indices refer to the period of 1980-1989. Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Greece and
Portugal were excluded from comparison because of lack of available data. Countries were ranked
according to KICBI index from the least independent to the most independent. G-M-T refers to po-
litical independence of their index.Table 2.  Spearman Rank Correlations Between different indices
INDEX Kicbi E-S ALESINA
CUKI 0.90 - -
G-M-T - 0.88 0.89
E-S - - 0.96
Notes: Spearman's rank correlation is calculated between those indices which were closely
comparable. KICBI and CUKI ranked the countries with a larger scale, while ALESINA, G-M-T
and E-S used the scale that was significantly smaller.























































Notes: Countries have been ranked according to policy independence (POLI) variable from the least
independent to the most independent. Right hand side scale refers to the scale of PERI and POLI
and left hand side to the scale of OBJE and FINI. The time period is 1980-1989.
Table 3. Spearman Rank Correlation between Different Forms of Legal Independence
INDEX PERI POLI OBJE FINI
PERI 1
POLI 0.66 (0.65) 1
OBJE 0.50 (0.48) 0.64 (0.72) 1
FINI 0.38 (0.32) 0.05 (0.28) 0.93 (0.89) 1
Notes: Values in brackets refer to year 1996 and values without brackets to the period of 1980-





















The U.K. 1.5 1.0
U.S. 1.0 1.0
Source: OECD (1997).
Notes: Centralisation and co-operation figures are based on OECD secretariat estimates of promi-
nent bargaining level and the degree of co-ordination in 1994. Co-ordination includes both union
and employer co-ordination. A value of 1 in each characteristic is assigned to the decentral-
ised/uncoordinated system and a value of 3 for the centralised/co-ordinated wage bargaining sys-





















The U.K. .34 .47
U.S. .16 .18
Source: OECD (1997, Table 3.3, p. 71)}
Notes: a) These figures refer to 1994 except in the case of collective bargaining coverage in Canada
(1993), Finland (1995) France (1995), Italy (1993), Japan (1995), Norway (1993), Portugal (1993)
and in the case of union density in Denmark (1993), Finland (1995), Germany (1993), Italy (1992),
the Netherlands (1993), Portugal (1990), Sweden (1993) and Switzerland (1992).Table 6. Estimation Results























































Notes: Dp refers to inflation, Dw to nominal wage growth and u to standardised unemployment rate.
Number of countries (N) is 17 and the time period runs from 1973-1996. Instrumental variable es-
timation was used with lagged dependent variables and growth rates as instruments. OBJE measures
an importance of price stability in the status of the central bank. POLI measures political independ-
ence of the central bank. PERI measures personnel independence of the central bank. COOP meas-
ures a degree of co-operation of wage bargaining (See Table 2). Higher the index, higher the degree
of co-operation. MOPO is constructed as MOPO=CENTRA*DENSITY and captures a monopoly
power of unions and effect of unions to aggregate wages. EITAR is dummy for countries that
adopted inflation targeting. C-D=(2-CENTRA) and captures the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis of
hump-shaped relationship between macroeconomic performance and a degree of centralisation of
wage bargaining. CODE = COVERAGE - DENSITY. Rw is real wage growth. Values in brackets
are panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). See the main text for more detailed explanations.Table 7.. Hypothesis Testing
Inflation equation Wage equation Unemployment
equation
Missspecification test LMr,m, = 2.62 (0.004) LMr,m = 1.09(0.580) LMr,m = 0.06(0.473)


















Notes: LMr,m refers to joint test for serial correlation and individual effects in the errors. See main text for more details.
a) This refers to the case where the variable DICODE, the difference between coverage and density rates, was excluded
from the model.
Appendix I
Unit root tests for the log of the unemployment rate u, log of the real consumption wage w, log of
the capital stock k and log of the terms of trade q
Table I.1: ADF unit root tests for the levels u, w, k and q, 1992.1 - 1996.2
Asymptotic Critical Values; 5 % = -3.476, 1 % = -4.097; Constant and Trend included
Variable Lag t-adf Beta (t-1) Sigma t-D D(lag) t-prob F-prob


























































































































Note: The test equation is xt = a + mt +r1xt-1 + r2xt-2 + ... + rpxt-p or Dxt = a + mt +b xt-1 + SgiDxt-i +
et, where we sum from 1 to p-1 and where b = r1 +r2 + ... + rp -1; t-adf = t-value on the lagged
level, tb; Beta (t-1) = sum of the estimated AR-coefficient,  r r r ˆ ˆ ˆ p 2 1   +   ...   +     +   ; sigma = standard error
of regression; t-D(lag) = t-value of the longest lag, tgj; t-prob = significance of the longest lag: 1 -P(‰t‰£ ‰tgj‰); F-prob = significance level of the F-test on the lags dropped up to that point; * sig-
nificant at 5 %.
Table I.2: ADF unit root tests for the first differences Du, Dw, Dk and Dq 1962.2 - 1996.2
Asymptotic Critical values: 5%= -2.904 1%= -3.528; Constant included (and Trend for CSTOCK)
Variable Lag t-adf Beta (t-1) Sigma t-D D(lag) t-prob F-prob
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Crit. Value;
5 % = -3.478










































Note: See Table I.1
Appendix II
Cointegration analysis of the system consisting of the log of the unemployment rate u, log of the
real consumption wage w, log of the capital stock k and log of the terms of trade q
Table II.1: Cointegration rank of the system 1962.2-1996.2
(a) Eigenvalues





1096.50        0
1112.09        1
1118.16        2
1121.85        3
1121.94        4(b) Test statistics





























Notes; Max l = maximal eigenvalue test for the rank; T-4k corrects the tests for small sample bias, i.e. uses T-4k in-
stead of T; CV 95% = 95% Critical Value; Trace = trace test for the rank; T-nm corrects the test for small sample bias.
c) Standardised b (eigenvectors)
    u    w    k      q
 1.000 -3.322  1.526    1.626
-0.032  1.000 -0.754   -0.878
 0.470 -9.990  1.000  18.899
-0.158 -7.625  4.723    1.000
(d) Standardised a-coefficients
   u
   w
   k





Table III.1  Recent changes in Central Bank Laws
Country Act Main Changes Code Change
Belgium 93 The Government cannot oppose the decision taken by
the CB relating to its key tasks






France 93 The CB shall formulate and implement monetary
policy with the aim of ensuring price stability
The CB shall neither seek nor accept instructions
from the government or any person







Greece 92 Credit for the government forbidden lla 0.25 ﬁ 1.0
New Zealand 89 Primary objectives defined as economic objectives of
achieving and maintaining stability in the general
price level
The bank has sole authority to implement monetary
policy, but override provisions of the government
exist




0.83  ﬁ 0.17
Italy 92
93
Governor sets the official discount rate





Spain 94 Primary objective price stability but supports the
general policy of the government if that does not
conflict with price stability
Term of office of the governor extended to 6 years
No instructions from the government in
implementation of monetary policy
Dismissal of governor restricted to non-policy
reasons only











Sweden 88 Term of office of the Governor extended into 5 years





Sources: Cukierman (1992), Cottarelli and Giannini (1997, Table 7, p. 18) and various central bank
laws.
Notes: Change of coding is based on own judgement of the central bank laws according to the main
changes introduced. Changes are then translated into numerical values following the coding in
Cukierman (1992).